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Abstract
In this paper we examine the empirical relationship between immigration and crime
across Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003. Drawing on police administrative
data, we first document that the size of immigrant population is positively correlated
with the incidence of property crimes and with the overall crime rate. Then, we use
instrumental variables based on migration toward other European countries to identify
the causal impact of exogenous changes of immigrant population in Italy. According to
these estimates, immigration increases only the incidence of robberies, while leaving un-
affected all other types of crime. Since robberies represent a very minor fraction of all
criminal offenses, the effect on the overall crime rate is not significantly different from zero.
Keywords: Immigration, crime.
JEL codes: F22, J15, K42, R10.
1 Introduction
Immigration is a contentious issue in all destination countries for at least two reasons. First,
worker flows from countries characterized by a different composition of the labor force may
have significant redistributive consequences for the native population. Second, there are
widespread concerns that immigrants increase crime rates. While the economic literature has
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devoted much attention to the first issue (Borjas, 1994; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Bauer and
Zimmermann, 2002; Card, 2005) the second one has remained largely unexplored.1
At the same time, citizens and policymakers in several host countries seem more con-
cerned about the impact of immigrants on crime. Figure 1 shows the results of the National
Identity survey carried on in 1995 and 2003 by the International Social Survey Programme.
It emerges clearly that the majority of population in OECD countries is worried that im-
migrants increase crime rates. In most cases this fraction is greater than that of people
afraid of being displaced from the labor market. These perceptions may have far-reaching
consequences for immigration policies (Bauer et al., 2000).
Moreover, standard economic theories of crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973) provide sev-
eral reasons why immigration could be possibly related to crime. For example, immigrants
and natives may have different propensities to commit crime because they face different le-
gitimate earnings opportunities, different probabilities to be convicted and different costs
of conviction. However, from a theoretical viewpoint, the direction of such effects is un-
clear. For example, immigrants may experience worse labor market conditions (LaLonde and
Topel, 1991; Borjas, 1998) but higher costs of conviction (Butcher and Piehl, 2005). Hence,
identifying such relation is ultimately an empirical issue.
In this paper we estimate the causal effect of immigration on crime across Italian provinces
during the period 1990-2003. For this purpose, we draw on police administrative records to
document the patterns of criminal offenses, disaggregated along various typologies, and of
immigration, both in its regular and irregular component.
As we discuss in the next Section, Italy displays several interesting features for our analy-
sis. First, during the last few years Italy has experienced a considerable increase in migration
pressures, mostly as a consequence of political turmoil in neighboring countries. Similarly
to many other receiving countries, this phenomenon resulted in substantial concerns at the
social and political level, mainly because of the alleged relationship between immigration
and crime. Second, during our sample period Italian authorities have implemented several
massive regularizations of previously unofficial immigrants, which allow for an estimate of
the irregular component of migration.
In Section 3 we start our econometric analysis with an OLS estimation in which we
control extensively for other determinants of criminal activity, as well as for province- and
year-specific unobserved heterogeneity. According to these estimates, a 1% increase in the
total number of immigrants is associated with a 0.1% increase in the total number of criminal
offenses. Once we distinguish among categories of crime, the effect seems particularly strong
for property crimes, and in particular for robberies and thefts.
We go on in Section 4 by asking whether this evidence can be attributed to a causal
effect of immigration on crime. Any interpretation in this sense must take into account that
the location choice of immigrants within the destination country may respond to unobserved
1Some notable exceptions are considered at the end of this Section.
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demand-pull factors that are also correlated with crime. As a result, OLS estimates may be
biased.
In order to solve this problem, we exploit differences in the intensity of migration by origin
country as a source of exogenous variation in the distribution of immigrants across Italian
provinces. In particular, we use changes of immigrant population by nationality in the rest
of Europe as an instrument for changes of immigrant population in Italy. Our identification
strategy relies on the fact that the supply-push component of migration by nationality is
common to flows toward all destination countries. At the same time, flows toward the rest of
Europe are exogenous to demand-pull factors in Italian provinces. Variation across provinces
of supply-driven shifts of immigrant population results from differences in the beginning-of-
period distribution of immigrants by origin country. Indeed, first stage estimates confirm
that our instrument provides a strongly statistically significant prediction of migration to
Italy.
Once we take into account the endogeneity of immigrants’ distribution across provinces,
the estimated effect of immigration on neither total nor property crimes is significantly dif-
ferent from zero. Distinguishing among different types of property crime, the estimated
coefficient is still statistically significant for robberies. However, the latter represent only a
very minor fraction of all crimes in our sample, which explains why the effect on the total
crime rate is not statistically significant.
As discussed in Section 5, these results seem robust with respect to measurement error of
immigrant population, spatial correlation of provincial crime data and heterogeneous effects
across different nationalities.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on immigration and crime. As pointed
out, very few studies have explored such issue. Butcher and Piehl (1998b, 2005) find that
current U.S. immigrants have lower incarceration rates than natives, while the pattern seems
reversed for immigrants in the early 1900s (Moehling and Piehl, 2007). At the aggregate
level, Butcher and Piehl (1998a) look at a sample of U.S. metropolitan areas over the 1980s
and conclude that new immigrants’ inflows had no significant impact on crime rates.
2 Immigration and crime in Italy: measurement and charac-
teristics
Immigration to Italy displays several interesting features for the purpose of our analysis.
First, it is a very recent phenomenon, which basically started in the early 1980s and took
off during the 1990s. The first law regulating the inflows of foreigners was approved in
1990, later amended in 1998 and 2002. Throughout this period, Italian migration policy has
remained grounded on the residence permit, which allows the holder to stay legally in the
country for a given period of time. We have drawn directly on police administrative records
for recovering the number of valid residence permits by province and nationality during the
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period 1990-2003. These data serve as our measure of legal immigration.
Second, immigration has increased dramatically over this period. The number of residence
permits rose by a factor of 5, from 436,000 in 1990 (less than 1% of total population) to over
2.2 millions in 2003 (4% of population). Such growth was significantly driven by push factors
in neighboring countries, like the collapse of Soviet Union and the Balkan Wars (see Del
Boca and Venturini, 2003). Overall, immigration from Eastern Europe grew at a rate of
537% during the period 1990-2003, as compared to 134% from Northern Africa and 170%
from Asia. Accordingly, our estimating strategy will exploit such push factors to identify the
causal effect of immigration on crime.
Third, during this period Italy implemented several regularizations, which offered irreg-
ular immigrants the possibility to obtain a residence permit. In particular, regularizations
in 1995, 1998, and 2002 involved 246, 217 and 700 thousand individuals, respectively. For
our purposes, regularizations are important as they provide snapshots of irregular migration.
During these episodes, in fact, immigrants had clear incentives to report their irregular sta-
tus. Hence, underreporting may be less serious and less correlated with other variables than
in survey data and in apprehension statistics.2
Therefore, we obtained from police administrative records also the demands for regular-
ization presented in 1995, 1998 and 2002. As it turns out, the distribution of regular and
irregular immigrants are tightly related. In particular, the ratio of the two is very stable
within provinces and (regularization) years. In order to see this, let MIGRit and IRRit be
the number of regular and irregular immigrants in province i and year t, respectively. Then,
we predict the latter based on the OLS regression
ÎRRit = µˆiMIGRit + µˆtMIGRit + νˆit,
where µˆi and µˆt are province- and year-specific estimated coefficients, respectively, and νˆit is
the estimated residual. Figure 2 shows that the difference between IRRit and ÎRRit at the
province-year level is almost negligible. Actually, the variance of νˆit is less than 2% of total
variance. It follows that
MIGR∗it
POPit
=
MIGRit
POPit
+
IRRit
POPit
≈ (1 + µi + µt)MIGRit
POPit
,
where MIGR∗it and POPit are total immigrants and population in each province-year, re-
spectively. Taking logarithms on both sides delivers
migr∗it = µi + µt +migrit + υit. (1)
where migr∗it and migrit are, respectively, the logarithms of total and regular immigrants
2In any case, all these alternative measures of irregular migration are strongly correlated with each other,
as we discuss further in Section 5.
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over population, and υit is an error term. The OLS estimated coefficient of migrit is 0.92
(R2 = 99%), which confirms that (after controlling for province and year fixed effects) regular
immigrants are approximately proportional to total immigrant population in each province-
year. Since total immigrants would be unobserved out of regularization years, we will use the
(log of) regular immigrants instead.
Turning to measures of criminal activity, we look at crimes reported by the police to the
judiciary authority, which are published yearly by the Italian Statistics Institute (ISTAT).
These data allow to distinguish among several types of criminal offenses: violent crimes,
property crimes (robbery, common theft, car theft) and drug-related crimes. Availability of
these data determined our sample period, 1990-2003. In 2004, in fact, a new national crime
recording standard has been adopted, which implies a lack of comparability of data before
and after that year (ISTAT, 2004, p.27).
In general, a major drawback of crime data is measurement error, caused for instance by
under-reporting, heterogeneous law enforcement, and so on. Following a standard approach
(Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1996), we assume that, first, the number of reported crimes, CRIMEit,
is proportional to the true (unobserved) number of committed crimes, CRIME∗it; second, the
constant of proportionality does not vary within provinces and years. It follows that
crime∗it = θi + θt + crimeit, (2)
where crime∗it and crimeit are, respectively, the logarithms of actual and reported crimes
over total population, and θi and θt are province and year fixed effects. Therefore, we will
use crimeit as a proxy for the true (unobserved) crime rate. Accordingly, total, violent,
property and drug will denote the logarithms of reported crimes over total population for
each category of criminal offenses.
At a first glance, criminal activity and immigration are not systematically correlated over
time (see Figure 3). On the other hand, immigration appears to be positively associated
with crime across provinces; in particular, both tend to be higher in the North (Figure 4).
However, both variables could respond to other (omitted) factors. For instance, higher wealth
in Northern Italy could encourage both immigration and property crimes, which represent
83% of all criminal offenses in our sample. Therefore, in the next section we move beyond
simple correlations and into multivariate econometric analysis.
3 Panel Analysis
Identifying the effect of migration on crime is complicated by the fact that both variables
are simultaneously determined in equilibrium. To address this issue, we start by controlling
for other variables that may affect both immigration and crime, along with province- and
year-specific unobserved heterogeneity. We thus assembled annual observations for all 95
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Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003.3
Our main estimating equation is
crimeit = βmigrit + γ′Xit + φi + φt + εit, (3)
where crimeit is the log of the crime rate reported by the police in province i during year t;
migrit is the log of immigrants over population; Xit is a set of control variables; finally, φi
and φt are province- and year-specific unobserved fixed effect, while εit is an error term. We
are mainly interested in identifying coefficient β.
The set of observablesXit comprises demographic, socioeconomic and politico-institutional
determinants of crime.4 Demographic variables include the log of resident population in the
province, pop. Since equation (3) includes province fixed effects, pop implicitly controls for
population density, which is considered a key determinant of the level of criminal activity
(Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). For the same reason, we control for the share of population
living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, urban. Finally, since young men are said
to be more prone to engage in criminal activities than the rest of the population (Freeman,
1991; Levitt, 1998; Grogger, 1998), we add the percentage of men aged 15-39, male1539.
Turning to the socioeconomic variables, we include the (log of) real GDP per capita, gdp,
and the unemployment rate, unemp. These factors proxy for the legitimate and illegitimate
earning opportunities (Ehrlich, 1973; Raphael and Winter-Ember, 2001; Gould et al., 2002).
The probability of apprehension captures instead the expected costs of crime. As a proxy
for such a probability, we use the clear − up rate, defined as the ratio of crimes cleared up
by the police over the total number of reported crimes, for each category of crime (Ehrlich,
1996). The political orientation of the local government may affect the amount of resources
devoted to crime deterrence and at the same time immigration restrictions at the local level.5
We measure the ideology of the local government with the variable partisan, which takes
higher values the more the local government leans toward the right of the political spectrum.
Finally, fixed effects control for other unobserved factors that do not vary within provinces
or years, including constants µ’s and θ’s in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
All variables’ detailed definitions and sources are presented in the Appendix. Table 1
shows some descriptive statistics and Table 2 reports the correlation matrix among all de-
pendent and explanatory variables. The univariate correlation between the log of immigrants
and crimes over population is positive for all types of crime.
OLS estimates on equation (3) are presented in Table 3 and suggest that the total crime
3Italian provinces correspond to level 3 in the Eurostat classification (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics); they are comparable in size to U.S. counties. In 1995, 8 new provinces were created by secession. In
order to keep our series consistent, we attribute their post-1995 data to the corresponding pre-1995 province.
4Freeman (1999), Eide et al. (2006) and Dills et al. (2008) review the empirical literature on the determi-
nants of crime.
5The distribution of residence permits across provinces is decided on a yearly basis by the government in
accordance with provincial authorities.
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rate is significantly correlated with the incidence of immigrants in the population. Such
relationship is robust to controlling for other determinants of crime. According to these
findings, a 1% increase in immigrant population is associated with a 0.1% increase of total
crime.
Distinguishing among types of crime, the effect is driven by property crimes, while violent
and drug-related crimes are unaffected by immigration. In order to better uncover this rela-
tionship, in Table 4 we disaggregate property crimes further. It turns out that immigration
increases the incidence of robberies and thefts. Since the latter represent about 60% of total
crimes in our sample, the relationship between immigration and property crimes may be the
main channel through which immigrants increase the crime rate.
However, there could be several reasons why immigrant population is systematically cor-
related with property crimes, some of which may not be adequately captured by control
variables. Therefore, identifying causality requires a source of exogenous variation in immi-
grant population, an issue that we tackle in the next Section.
4 Causality
Even after controlling for other determinants of crime and for fixed effects, the distribution
of immigrant population across provinces could be correlated with the error term for at least
two reasons. First, our set of controls could neglect some time-varying, possibly unobserved
demand-pull factors that are also correlated with crime. For instance, improvements in labor
market conditions that are not adequately captured by changes in official unemployment
and income could increase immigration and decrease crime, which would bias OLS estimates
downward. On the other hand, economic decline could attract immigrants to some areas
(e.g. because of declining housing prices) where crime is on the rise, which would bias OLS
estimates upward. Finally, changes in crime rates across provinces could have a direct effect
on immigrants’ location.
In order to take these concerns into account, we adopt a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS)
approach that uses the (exogenous) supply-push component of migration by nationality as an
instrument for shifts in immigrants’ population across Italian provinces. Supply-push factors
are all events in origin countries that increase the propensity of population to emigrate; exam-
ples include economic crises, political turmoil, wars and natural disasters (see, for instance,
Card, 1990; Friedberg, 2001; Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Munshi, 2003; Saiz, 2007). Since
these are both important in determining migration outflows and independent of regional dif-
ferences within the host country, they have often been used as a source of exogenous variation
in the distribution of immigrant population. In particular, several papers have constructed
outcome-based measures of supply-push factors using total migration flows by nationality
toward the destination country of interest.6
6See, among others, Card (2001), Lewis (2005) and Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
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In principle, however, since new immigrants of a given nationality tend to settle into the
same areas as previous immigrants from the same country (see e.g. Munshi, 2003; Jaeger, 2006;
McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007), total flows by nationality could be still correlated with local
demand-pull factors.7 For this reason, our instrument will be based on bilateral migration
flows toward European countries other than Italy. Specifically, we first take within-province
differences of equation (1) and decompose ∆migrit = migrit −migrit−1 as follows:
∆migrit ≈
∑
n
ωnit−1 ×∆ lnMIGRnit −∆popit, (4)
where the superscript n denotes nationalities and ωnit−1 = MIGR
n
it−1/MIGRit−1. The first
term on the right-hand side is the sum of log-changes of immigrants from country n into des-
tination province i, weighted at beginning-of-period nationality shares within each province.
These depend on both supply-push factors in each origin country (which affect that national-
ity in all provinces) and demand-pull factors in each province (which affect all nationalities in
that province. In order to exclude the latter, we substitute ∆ lnMIGRnit with the log-change
of immigrants of nationality n in the rest of Europe, ∆ lnMIGRn.
Hence, we define the predicted log-change of immigrants over population in each province
as
∆̂migrit =
∑
n
ωnit−1 ×∆ lnMIGRn. (5)
Since demand-pull factors in other European countries can be reasonably thought as exoge-
nous to variation between Italian provinces, the correlation between ∆migrit and ∆̂migrit
must be due solely to supply-push factors in origin countries.
To construct our instrument we use the log changes of immigrant population from 13 origin
countries in 11 European countries using decennial census data in the host countries.8 Figure
5 shows that the patterns of immigration toward the rest of Europe resemble those observed in
Italy, which points at the importance of supply-push factors. Indeed, the univariate regression
confirms that our instrument fits well the actual changes of immigrant population across
provinces over the 1990s,
∆migrit = 0.671
(0.094)
+ 0.673
(0.178)
∆̂migrit.
where the numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. The
7In the limit, if all immigrants from a given country moved to the same Italian province, it would be
impossible to disentangle push and pull factors.
8Ideally, one would use total outflows from origin countries (possibly excluding inflows to Italy) as a measure
of supply-push factors. Unfortunately, these data are generally not available. The destination countries
for which we obtained census data are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Information on the stock of immigrants in those countries was
available for the following nationalities: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China (excluding Hong Kong), Egypt, India,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Tunisia, Former Yugoslavia. Overall, immigrants from
these countries accounted for 48% and 56% of Italian residence permits in 1991 and 2001, respectively.
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F-statistic of the regression is equal to 14.24, which is above the lower bounds indicated by
the literature on weak instruments (see Bound et al., 1995; Stock and Yogo, 2002).
Once equipped with this instrument for immigrant population, we turn to examine its
effect on crime rates in the second stage. The results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. For the
sake of comparability between OLS and 2SLS, in each table we also present OLS estimates
on the cross section of log changes between 1991 and 2001.
While the OLS estimates on 10-years changes are broadly consistent with panel estimates
using all years, the 2SLS estimates present significant differences. First, the effect of immi-
gration on the total number of criminal offenses is smaller and not statistically significant
anymore, and the same is true for property crimes. Once we distinguish among different ty-
pologies of property crimes (Table 6), immigration has no significant effect on thefts. On the
other hand, the effect on robberies is still significant. Indeed, its magnitude is much greater
than the OLS estimate. This finding may point at the existence of demand-pull factors (not
captured by control variables) that have opposite effects on immigration and on the incidence
of robberies.9
Overall, these results suggest that the causal effect of immigration on either violent,
property or drug-related crimes is not significantly different from zero. Robberies are the
only type of criminal activity that we found to be positively and significantly affected by
immigration. According to our estimates, the incidence robberies varies approximately one-
to-one (in percentage) with the ratio of immigrants over population. Yet, within our sample
robberies represent only 1.8% and 1.5% of property and total crimes, respectively, which
explains why the incidence of neither property nor total crimes is significantly related to
immigration.
5 Robustness
Our findings may be subject to several caveats, the most significant of which concern the
measurement of immigrant population. A first issue relates to its composition by nationality.
In order to avoid arbitrary classifications, our measure includes all residence permits, regard-
less of immigrants’ origin countries. On the other hand, most crime concerns are directed
toward immigrants from developing countries. While it is beyond the scope of this paper
to investigate the relationship between nationality and propensity to crime, one may won-
der whether adopting this broader definition introduces error in the measurement of those
immigrants that could be more at risk of committing crime.10 Therefore, we checked the
9An alternative explanation could be that OLS estimates suffer from attenuation bias due to measurement
errors in immigrant population. However, if this was the reason, we should observe an analogous bias for all
types of crime, which does not seem to be the case.
10This measurement issue is particularly relevant for Italy. In our sample, about 85% of all immigrants
from outside developing countries came from U.S. and Switzerland. These are very peculiar groups: the first
includes mostly U.S. military servants, the second Swiss citizens that commute daily between Switzerland and
Italy.
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robustness of our estimates to using only residence permits awarded to immigrants from de-
veloping countries, migrdcit . The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8, and are remarkably
similar to those obtained using all residence permits.
Also, differences among nationalities could explain the differences between OLS and 2SLS
estimates. The latter are based on a subset of nationalities (those for which we found Cen-
sus data for other European countries). Therefore, if the excluded nationalities had higher
propensity to crime than those included in the instrument, that would cause the observed
drop in magnitude and significance from OLS to 2SLS (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In order
to check whether that is the case, we run again OLS regressions including in the measure
of immigration only those nationalities included in the instrument. Results are reported in
Tables 9 and are not significantly different from those in Tables 5 and 6. Hence, basing our
instrument on a subset of nationalities does not drive the difference between 2SLS and OLS
estimates.
Another issue relates to the dimension of irregular immigration in Italy. As discussed in
Section 3, we used demands for regularization to infer the distribution of irregular immigrants,
arguing that this approach minimizes under-reporting. In principle, however, one can not
exclude that immigrants self-select into regularization, which would introduce measurement
error into equation (1). In particular, if immigrants who are more at risk of committing
crime are also less likely to apply for a regular permit, we would be understating immigrants
exactly where they contribute the most to crime, which in turn would bias the coefficient of
migr downward.
For this reason, we looked also at apprehensions of irregular immigrants (as recorded by
Ministero dell’Interno (2007)) which do not depend on self-selection. Indeed, after controlling
for province- and year-specific constants (which are always included in our specifications)
the log of apprehensions is positively and significantly related to the log of demands for
regularization. In particular, the OLS estimated coefficient of the univariate regression is
0.35, the t-ratio is 3.87 and the R2 is 85%. Therefore, apprehension- and regularization-
based measures of irregular immigration seem consistent with each other. At the same time,
regularizations provide a more representative picture of the phenomenon.11
In addition, the 2SLS approach adopted in Section 5 would attenuate any bias due to
under-reporting of irregular immigrants. In fact, if both regular and irregular immigrants of
the same nationality cluster into the same areas, then our instrument provides a measure for
the predicted log-change of total immigrants that depends solely on geographic distribution
and supply-push factors by nationality.
Finally, mobility across the borders of different provinces may give rise to spatial corre-
lation in provincial crime data. In line with the literature on spatial econometrics and crime
(Anselin, 1988; Gibbons, 2004; Zenou, 2003), we thus control for spatially lagged crime rates.
11In 1995 there were less than 64,000 apprehensions and 260,000 demands for regularization; this ratio was
61,000 over 250,000 in 1998 and 106,000 over 700,000 in 2002
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These consist of weighted averages of crime rates in neighboring provinces. In particular,
crime in province i is assumed to depend also on crime observed in any other province j,
weighted by the inverse of the distance between their capital cities. The results, presented in
Table 10, are consistent with those in our baseline specification. Hence, spatial correlation
does not affect affect our results. This is probably due to the fact that provinces are rather
large geographical areas, so that crime trips occur within rather than across provinces.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the causal impact of immigration on crime across Italian
provinces during the 1990s. According to our estimates, total criminal offenses as well as
most types of crime are not related to the size of immigrant population once endogeneity is
taken into account.
We view our contribution as a first step towards a better understanding of this relation-
ship. There are several ways in which our analysis can be extended in search of more detailed
mechanisms, and we sketch only a few here.
First, one can explore natives’ response to an increase in immigration. Our result, in fact,
could be due to the fact that immigrants and natives have similar propensities to commit
crime and/or there is substitution between immigrants’ and natives’ crime.12 Moving in
this direction would require more detailed criminal statistics, which allow to distinguish the
nationality of the offender.13
Second, we estimate the average effect of immigration conditional on its current composi-
tion. However, this effect is probably different for regular and irregular immigrants. Indeed,
it would be extremely interesting to estimate separately the effect of the two. But while the
strong correlation between the two is useful for recovering the variation in total immigrants
using only the regular ones, it does not allow to disentangle their separate effects.
A better understanding of such mechanisms seems crucial also for policy prescriptions. In
fact, any change in migration restrictions is likely to affect both the size and composition of
immigrant population (Bianchi, 2007; Giordani and Ruta, 2008). Therefore, its impact may
differ from the one estimated by keeping immigrants’ composition constant. This effect has
to be considered before arguing in favor or against tighter immigration restrictions.
12Borjas et al. (2006) argues that recent immigrants have contributed to the criminal activity of native black
males in the U.S. by displacing them from the labor market.
13However, these data are publicly available for Italy only since 2000 on.
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Appendix
Variables: definitions and sources
migr: log of residence permits over total province population, as of December 31 of each
year. Source: Ministry of Interior.
total: log og reported crimes in each province and year. This category includes murder,
serious assault, rape, sex offence, theft, robbery, extortion, kidnapping, incrimination for
criminal association, arson, terrorism, drug-related crime, forgery and counterfeiting, fraud,
prostitution, other crimes. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute
of Statistics.
violent: log of reported violent crimes over total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
property: log of reported property crimes over total population in each province and year.
This category includes robberies, thefts and car thefts. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali
- Italian National Institute of Statistics.
theft: log of reported thefts over total population in each province and year. This category
includes several types of crime such as: bag snatch and pickpocketing. Source: Statistiche
Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
robbery: log of reported robberies over total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
car theft: log of reported car thefts over total population in each province and year. Source:
Statistiche Giudiziarie Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
drug: log of reported drug-related crimes over total population in each province and year.
This category includes trafficking, consumption and pushing. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
pop: log of resident population in each province and year. Source: Popolazione e movimento
anagrafico dei comuni - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
urban: percentage of population living in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in each
province and year. Source: Popolazione e movimento anagrafico dei comuni - Italian National
Institute of Statistics.
male1539: percentage of young males aged 15-39 in the population in each province and
year. Source: Popolazione e movimento anagrafico dei comuni - Italian National Institute of
Statistics.
gdp: log of real GDP per-capita in each province and year. Source: Conti Economici Terri-
toriali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
15
unemp: percentage unemployment ratio in each province and year. Source: Labour Force
Survey - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
clear−up: percentage ratio of the number of crimes cleared by the police to the total number
of reported crimes, for each province, year and crime category. Source: Statistiche Giudiziarie
Penali - Italian National Institute of Statistics.
partisan: ideology of the provincial government. This variable is constructed as follows.
First, a score between 0 (extreme left) and 20 (extreme right) is attached to each political
party according to the expert surveys presented in Benoit and Laver (2006) (these data are
available at http://www.tcd.ie/Political Science/ppmd/). Then, the score of the local gov-
ernment is computed as the average score of all parties entering executive cabinet weighted
by the number of seats held by each party in the local council (the composition of Italian
local councils is available at http://amministratori.interno.it/).
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Figure 1: Opinions about immigrants: crime vs. labor market concerns
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This graph presents the results of the “National Identity “survey conducted in 1995 and 2003 by the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme. The vertical axis is the percentage of interviewed in each country that
declared to “Strongly Agree”or “Agree”that “Immigrants increase crime rates ”. The horizontal axis is the
percentage of interviewed in each country that declared to “Strongly Agree”or “Agree”that “Immigrants take
jobs away from natives ”.
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted irregular immigrants
This figure plots the actual number of irregular immigrants (on the vertical axis) against the number predicted
based on regular immigrants (on the horizontal axis) along with the 45-degree line. The actual number of
irregular immigrants is given by the number of demands for regularization presented in province i and year t.
The prediction is based on regression ÎRRit = µˆiMIGRit + µˆtMIGRit + νˆit, where MIGRit is the number of
residence permits in province i and year t during years 1995, 1998 and 2002 (see Section 2 for further details).
The source of data on both residence permits and demands for regularization is the Italian Ministry of Interior.
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Figure 3: Immigration and crime over time
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This graph shows the evolution over time of reported crimes and residence permits in Italy. The histogram
refers to the number of reported crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, distinguishing between different categories
of criminal offenses. The line refers to the number of residence permits awarded to immigrants in Italy, per
100,000 inhabitants. The source of data on reported crimes and residence permits are ISTAT and the Italian
Ministry of Interior, respectively.
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Figure 4: Immigration and crime across provinces
These figures show the distribution, across Italian provinces, of the number of immigrants and reported crimes
per 100,000 inhabitants. All variables are yearly averages during the period 1990-2003. Provinces are colored
according to which quartile of the distribution they belong to; darker colors refer to higher values. The
extremes of each quartile, along with the corresponding color, are reported at the bottom of each map. The
sources of data for residence permits and reported crimes are ISTAT and the Italian Ministry of Interior,
respectively.
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Figure 5: Immigration to Italy and to the rest of Europe
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This figure plots the log-change of immigrant population in Italy during the 1991-2001 period (on the vertical
axis) against the log-change of immigrant population in other European countries during the same period
(on the horizontal axis), by country of origin. Immigrant population in Italy is measured by the number of
residence permits, as reported by the Italian Ministry of Interior. Immigrant population in other European
countries is measured using the 1991 and 2001 rounds of national census. The destination countries for which
we obtained census data are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Information on the stock of immigrants in those countries was available for
the following nationalities: Albania, Algeria, Brazil, China (excluding Hong Kong), Egypt, India, Morocco,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Tunisia, Former Yugoslavia.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
observations mean std. dev. min. max
Residence permits per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 1353 1187 44 7873
Total crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 3388 1350 1072 13404
Violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 50 29 1 230
Property crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 2615 1216 442 7879
robberies 1330 37 41 2 385
thefts 1330 1943 909 321 6049
car thefts 1330 287 281 29 1648
Drug-related crimes per 100,000 inhabitants 1330 64 45 5 918
migr 1330 -4.64 0.85 -7.73 -2.54
total 1330 -3.45 0.37 -4.54 -2.01
violent 1330 -7.75 0.55 -11.19 -6.07
property 1330 -3.75 0.45 -5.42 -2.54
robbery 1330 -8.23 0.75 -10.74 -5.56
theft 1330 -4.04 0.45 -5.74 -2.81
car theft 1330 -6.22 0.83 -8.14 -4.11
drug 1330 -7.52 0.57 -9.84 -4.69
pop 1330 13.01 0.70 11.41 15.18
urban 1235 14.62 20.15 0.00 88.11
male1539 1330 18.01 1.23 14.41 21.03
gdp 1235 9.55 0.26 8.94 10.11
unemp 1045 10.43 7.09 1.68 33.16
clear − up (total crimes) 1330 30.54 10.47 9.20 82.75
clear − up (violent crimes) 1330 82.03 12.93 23.32 100.00
clear − up (property crimes) 1330 6.92 3.18 1.60 30.83
clear − up (drug-related crimes) 1330 95.77 5.61 37.71 100.00
partisan 1330 10.26 1.75 5.90 16.30
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for all dependent and explanatory variables across the
95 Italian provinces during the period 1990-2003.
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